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Moral Hazard and Limited Liability: The Real Effects of Contract Bargaining

Economics Letters - Netherlands
doi 10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00141-4
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Abstract

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Categories
EconomicsFinanceEconometrics
Date

November 1, 1998

Authors
Rohan Pitchford
Publisher

Elsevier BV


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