Correlated Equilibria in Two-Player Repeated Games With Nonobservable Actions

Mathematics of Operations Research - United States
doi 10.1287/moor.17.1.175
Full Text
Abstract

Available in full text

Date
Authors
Publisher

Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)

Related search

Two-Player Repeated Games With Nonobservable Actions and Observable Payoffs

Mathematics of Operations Research
Management ScienceComputer Science ApplicationsOperations ResearchMathematics
1992English

Perfect Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games With Imperfect Monitoring

Games and Economic Behavior
EconomicsEconometricsFinance
2009English

Nash Equilibria in the Response Strategy of Correlated Games

Scientific Reports
Multidisciplinary
2019English

On Two-Player Repeated Games With Lack of Information on One Side and State-Independent Signalling

Mathematics of Operations Research
Management ScienceComputer Science ApplicationsOperations ResearchMathematics
2000English

Computing Pure Bayesian-Nash Equilibria in Games With Finite Actions and Continuous Types

Artificial Intelligence
LinguisticsLanguageArtificial Intelligence
2013English

Two-Player Nonzero-Sum Omega-Regular Games

2004English

On the Expected Number and Distribution of Equilibria in Multi-Player Evolutionary Games

2019English

Computing Uniformly Optimal Strategies in Two-Player Stochastic Games

Economic Theory
EconomicsEconometrics
2009English

Leontief Economies Encode Nonzero Sum Two-Player Games

2006English

Amanote Research

Note-taking for researchers

Follow Amanote

© 2024 Amaplex Software S.P.R.L. All rights reserved.

Privacy PolicyRefund Policy