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A Model of Moral-Hazard Credit Cycles

Journal of Political Economy - United States
doi 10.1086/668839
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Abstract

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Categories
EconomicsEconometrics
Date

October 1, 2012

Authors
Roger B. Myerson
Publisher

University of Chicago Press


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