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Private Information, Self-Serving Biases, and Optimal Settlement Mechanisms: Theory and Evidence

SSRN Electronic Journal
doi 10.2139/ssrn.398840
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Abstract

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Date

January 1, 2003

Authors
Seth SeaburyEric L. Talley
Publisher

Elsevier BV


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