(PDF) Do Overconfident CEOs Pay More to Shareholders?

Do Overconfident CEOs Pay More to Shareholders? Evidence From the US Market

Journal of Corporate Finance Research / Корпоративные Финансы | ISSN: 2073-0438

doi 10.17323/j.jcfr.2073-0438.13.2.2019.25-35

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Date

November 20, 2019

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Publisher

National Research University, Higher School of Economics (HSE)

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