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Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms in Pure Exchange Economies
Social Choice and Welfare
- United States
doi 10.1007/bf00177662
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Categories
Economics
Social Sciences
Econometrics
Date
July 1, 1991
Authors
Lin Zhou
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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