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Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms in Pure Exchange Economies

Social Choice and Welfare - United States
doi 10.1007/bf00177662
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Abstract

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Categories
EconomicsSocial SciencesEconometrics
Date

July 1, 1991

Authors
Lin Zhou
Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC


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