Sequential Auctions for Common Value Objects With Budget Constrained Bidders

Studies in Computational Intelligence- Germany

doi 10.1007/978-3-642-03190-8_2

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Artificial Intelligence

Date

January 1, 2009

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Publisher

Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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