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On the Impossibility of Deterrence in Sequential Colonel Blotto Games

International Game Theory Review - Singapore
doi 10.1142/s0219198912500119
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Abstract

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Categories
StatisticsBusinessProbabilityUncertaintyInternational ManagementComputer Science
Date

June 1, 2012

Authors
KJELL HAUSKEN
Publisher

World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt


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