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Competing First-Price and Second-Price Auctions

Economic Theory - Germany
doi 10.1007/s00199-018-1161-5
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Abstract

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Categories
EconomicsEconometrics
Date

November 13, 2018

Authors
Joyce DelnoijKris De Jaegher
Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC


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