Revealing Preferences: Empirical Estimation of a Crisis Bargaining Game With Incomplete Information

Political Analysis - United Kingdom
doi 10.1093/pan/mpg021
Full Text
Abstract

Available in full text

Date
Authors
Publisher

Cambridge University Press (CUP)

Related search

Bargaining Under Incomplete Information a Numerical Example

Models of Strategic Rationality
1988English

Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining With One-Sided Incomplete Information

1985English

Finite Approximations to a Zero-Sum Game With Incomplete Information

International Journal of Game Theory
StatisticsProbabilityUncertaintyEconomicsSocial SciencesMathematicsEconometrics
1990English

Bargaining With Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model With Two-Sided Uncertainty

Review of Economic Studies
EconomicsEconometrics
1984English

An Alternative View of Uncertainty in Bilateral Bargaining Models With Incomplete Information

6th International Conference on Research into Design, ICoRD 2017
Decision SciencesComputer Science
2012English

Bargaining With History-Dependent Preferences

Journal of Economic Theory
EconomicsEconometrics
2007English

Incomplete-Information Models of Guilt Aversion in the Trust Game

Management Science
Management ScienceManagementOperations ResearchStrategy
2016English

Empirical Estimation of Information Measures: A Literature Guide

Entropy
Electronic EngineeringInformation SystemsMathematical PhysicsElectricalAstronomyPhysics
2019English

Decision Theory for Agents With Incomplete Preferences

Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Philosophy
2013English

Amanote Research

Note-taking for researchers

Follow Amanote

© 2024 Amaplex Software S.P.R.L. All rights reserved.

Privacy PolicyRefund Policy