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Monitoring Institutions in Indefinitely Repeated Games

Experimental Economics - Netherlands
doi 10.1007/s10683-017-9532-5
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Abstract

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Categories
EconomicsEconometricsFinance
Date

July 4, 2017

Authors
Gabriele CameraMarco Casari
Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC


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