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Relative Performance Evaluation, Agent Hold-Up and Firm Organization

SSRN Electronic Journal
doi 10.2139/ssrn.1063241
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Abstract

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Date

January 1, 2007

Authors
Ola KvaloyTrond E. Olsen
Publisher

Elsevier BV


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