Amanote Research

Amanote Research

    RegisterSign In

Compensation of Divisional Managers: Peer Effects Inside the Firm

SSRN Electronic Journal
doi 10.2139/ssrn.2458412
Full Text
Open PDF
Abstract

Available in full text

Date

January 1, 2013

Authors
Ran DuchinAmir GoldbergDenis Sosyura
Publisher

Elsevier BV


Related search

Inside the Black Box: The Role and Composition of Compensation Peer Groups

SSRN Electronic Journal
2010English

CEO Compensation, Director Compensation, and Firm Performance: Evidence of Cronyism

SSRN Electronic Journal
2002English

Peer Choice in CEO Compensation

SSRN Electronic Journal
2012English

From Inside the Firm to the Growth Process

Journal of the European Economic Association
EconomicsEconometricsFinance
2003English

Optimal Compensation Contracts When Managers Can Hedge

Journal of Financial Economics
ManagementFinanceEconomicsStrategyAccountingEconometrics
2010English

Peer Choice in CEO Compensation*

SSRN Electronic Journal
2009English

Taxation and the Allocation of Risk Inside the Multinational Firm

Journal of Public Economics
EconomicsEconometricsFinance
2020English

Managers Compensation and Collusive Behaviour Under Cournot Oligopoly

Applied Mathematical Sciences
2013English

Does Whom You Work With Matter? Effects of Referent Group Gender and Age Composition on Managers' Compensation.

Journal of Applied Psychology
Applied Psychology
2003English

Amanote Research

Note-taking for researchers

Follow Amanote

© 2025 Amaplex Software S.P.R.L. All rights reserved.

Privacy PolicyRefund Policy