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Should Sellers Prefer Auctions? A Laboratory Comparison of Auctions and Sequential Mechanisms

Management Science - United States
doi 10.1287/mnsc.2013.1800
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Abstract

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Categories
Management ScienceManagementOperations ResearchStrategy
Date

April 1, 2014

Authors
Andrew M. DavisElena KatokAnthony M. Kwasnica
Publisher

Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)


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