Bilevel Programming Methods for Computing Single-Leader-Multi-Follower Equilibria in Normal-Form and Polymatrix Games

EURO Journal on Computational Optimization - Germany
doi 10.1007/s13675-019-00114-8
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Springer Science and Business Media LLC

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