Supplementary Health Insurance as a Tool for Risk-Selection in Mandatory Basic Health Insurance Markets

Health Economics, Policy and Law - United Kingdom
doi 10.1017/s1744133107004124
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Health Policy
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Cambridge University Press (CUP)

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