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Ascending Combinatorial Auctions With Risk Averse Bidders

Group Decision and Negotiation - Netherlands
doi 10.1007/s10726-015-9454-6
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Categories
ArtsManagementHumanitiesDecision SciencesStrategyInnovationManagement of TechnologySocial Sciences
Date

September 29, 2015

Authors
Kemal GulerMartin BichlerIoannis Petrakis
Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC


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