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Information Structures in Optimal Auctions

Journal of Economic Theory - United States
doi 10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.001
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Abstract

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Categories
EconomicsEconometrics
Date

November 1, 2007

Authors
Dirk BergemannMartin Pesendorfer
Publisher

Elsevier BV


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