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Stackelberg Beats Cournot - On Collusion and Efficiency in Experimental Markets

Economic Journal - United States
doi 10.1111/1468-0297.00658
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Abstract

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Categories
EconomicsEconometrics
Date

October 1, 2001

Authors
Steffen HuckWieland MüllerHans-Theo Normann
Publisher

Oxford University Press (OUP)


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