Amanote Research

Amanote Research

    RegisterSign In

An Investigation of the Average Bid Mechanism for Procurement Auctions

Management Science - United States
doi 10.1287/mnsc.2013.1893
Full Text
Open PDF
Abstract

Available in full text

Categories
Management ScienceManagementOperations ResearchStrategy
Date

June 1, 2015

Authors
Wei-Shiun ChangBo ChenTimothy C. Salmon
Publisher

Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)


Related search

Bid Preference Programs and Participation in Highway Procurement Auctions

American Economic Review
EconomicsEconometrics
2011English

Security Bid Auctions for Agency Contracts

SSRN Electronic Journal
2013English

Sequential Procurement Auctions

Journal of Public Economics
EconomicsEconometricsFinance
1986English

Probabilistic Procurement Auctions

Review of Economic Design
EconomicsEconometricsFinance
2014English

Models for Iterative Multiattribute Procurement Auctions

Management Science
Management ScienceManagementOperations ResearchStrategy
2005English

Corruption in Procurement Auctions

SSRN Electronic Journal
2006English

Multi-Unit Demand Auctions With Synergies: Behavior in Sealed-Bid Versus Ascending-Bid Uniform-Price Auctions

Games and Economic Behavior
EconomicsEconometricsFinance
2005English

Quick Abnormal-Bid-Detection Method for Construction Contract Auctions

Journal of Construction Engineering and Management - ASCE
BuildingIndustrial RelationsManagementCivilStructural EngineeringStrategyConstruction
2015English

Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions

SSRN Electronic Journal
2001English

Amanote Research

Note-taking for researchers

Follow Amanote

© 2026 Amaplex Software S.P.R.L. All rights reserved.

Privacy PolicyRefund Policy