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Bid Shading and Bidder Surplus in the U.S. Treasury Auction System

doi 10.3386/w24024
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Abstract

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Date

November 1, 2017

Authors
Ali HortaçsuJakub KastlAllen Zhang
Publisher

National Bureau of Economic Research


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