Level-K Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?

Econometrica - United Kingdom
doi 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00810.x
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The Econometric Society

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