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Evolution of Beliefs and the Nash Equilibrium of Normal Form Games

Journal of Economic Theory - United States
doi 10.1006/jeth.1996.0098
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Abstract

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Categories
EconomicsEconometrics
Date

August 1, 1996

Authors
Masaki Aoyagi
Publisher

Elsevier BV


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