Amanote Research

Amanote Research

    RegisterSign In

Bargaining and Collusion in a Regulatory Model

doi 10.4337/9781781005699.00020
Full Text
Open PDF
Abstract

Available in full text

Date

Unknown

Authors
Raffaele FioccoMario Gilli
Publisher

Edward Elgar Publishing


Related search

Collusion, Exclusion, and Inclusion in Random-Order Bargaining

Review of Economic Studies
EconomicsEconometrics
2003English

A Bargaining Model of Holdouts and Takings

American Law and Economics Review
LawFinance
2007English

Efficient Wage Bargaining in a Dynamic Macroeconomic Model

SSRN Electronic Journal
2012English

A Bargaining Model of Tax Competition

Journal of Public Economics
EconomicsEconometricsFinance
2008English

Legislative Coalitions in a Bargaining Model With Externalities

English

A Model of Tacit Collusion: Nash-2 Equilibrium Concept

Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications
2016English

A Continuous-Time Model of Multilateral Bargaining

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
EconomicsEconometricsFinance
2015English

Collusion-Free Multiparty Computation in the Mediated Model

Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Computer ScienceTheoretical Computer Science
2009English

A Nash Bargaining Model for Simple Exchange Networks

Social Networks
AnthropologySociologyPsychologyPolitical ScienceSocial Sciences
2006English

Amanote Research

Note-taking for researchers

Follow Amanote

© 2025 Amaplex Software S.P.R.L. All rights reserved.

Privacy PolicyRefund Policy