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Market Discipline, Disclosure and Moral Hazard in Banking

SSRN Electronic Journal
doi 10.2139/ssrn.423986
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Abstract

Available in full text

Date

January 1, 2003

Authors
Erlend NierUrsel Baumann
Publisher

Elsevier BV


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