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Publications by Daisuke Hirata
Supplementary Note to 'On Stable and Strategy-Proof Rules in Matching Markets With Contracts'
SSRN Electronic Journal
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Maximal Domains for Strategy-Proof or Maskin Monotonic Choice Rules
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