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Publications by Ilya R. Segal
Dynamic Mechanism Design: Incentive Compatibility, Profit Maximization and Information Disclosure
SSRN Electronic Journal
Designing the US Incentive Auction
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Incentive Compatibility
Survival Versus Profit Maximization in a Dynamic Stochastic Experiment
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Dynamic Pricing and Profit Maximization for the Cloud With Geo-Distributed Data Centers
Incentive Compatibility and Information Superiority of the Core of an Economy With Differential Information
Economic Theory
Economics
Econometrics
Incentive Compatibility and Information Superiority of the Core of an Economy With Differential Information
Incentive Compatibility on the Blockchain
SSRN Electronic Journal
Incentive Compatibility on the Blockchain
Social Design
Dynamic Mechanism Design
Incentive Compatibility as a Nonnegative Martingale
