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Competitive Insurance Markets and Adverse Selection in the Lab

SSRN Electronic Journal
doi 10.2139/ssrn.1682052
Full Text
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Abstract

Available in full text

Date

January 1, 2010

Authors
Dorra RiahiLouis Levy GarbouaClaude Montmarquette
Publisher

Elsevier BV


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