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Unnatural Selection: Perverse Incentives and the Misallocation of Credit in Japan

American Economic Review - United States
doi 10.1257/0002828054825691
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Abstract

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Categories
EconomicsEconometrics
Date

August 1, 2005

Authors
Joe PeekEric S Rosengren
Publisher

American Economic Association


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