Amanote Research
Register
Sign In
Repeated Games With Stationary Bounded Recall Strategies
Journal of Economic Theory
- United States
doi 10.1016/0022-0531(88)90153-6
Full Text
Open PDF
Abstract
Available in
full text
Categories
Economics
Econometrics
Date
October 1, 1988
Authors
Ehud Lehrer
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Related search
Better-Reply Strategies With Bounded Recall
Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games With Observation Lags
Journal of Economic Theory
Economics
Econometrics
Zero-Determinant Strategies in Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games
Strategies for Repeated Games With Subsystem Takeovers Implementable by Deterministic and Self-Stabilising Automata
International Journal of Autonomous and Adaptive Communications Systems
Electronic Engineering
Electrical
Computer Science
Repeated Games With Present-Biased Preferences
Journal of Economic Theory
Economics
Econometrics
Folk Theorems With Bounded Recall Under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring
Games and Economic Behavior
Economics
Econometrics
Finance
Reputations in Repeated Games
SSRN Electronic Journal
Perfect Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games With Imperfect Monitoring
Games and Economic Behavior
Economics
Econometrics
Finance
Monitoring Institutions in Indefinitely Repeated Games
Experimental Economics
Economics
Econometrics
Finance