Epistemic Norms, Closure, and No-Belief Hinge Epistemology

Synthese - Netherlands
doi 10.1007/s11229-019-02165-1
Full Text
Abstract

Available in full text

Date
Authors
Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Related search

Closure, Credence and Rationality: A Problem for Non-Belief Hinge Epistemology

Synthese
PhilosophySocial Sciences
2019English

Epistemic Value Theory and Social Epistemology

Episteme
Philosophy of ScienceHistory
2006English

In Quest of a Wittgensteinian Hinge Epistemology

WITTGENSTEINIAN (adj.)
2019English

Epistemic Supervenience, Anti-Individualism, and Knowledge-First Epistemology

2017English

Epistemic Duties and Blameworthiness for Belief

English

Virtue Epistemology and the Sources of Epistemic Value

2018English

Categorical Norms and Convention-Relativism About Epistemic Discourse

Dialectica
Philosophy
2017English

Preferential Belief Change Using Generalized Epistemic Entrenchment

Journal of Logic, Language and Information
LinguisticsPhilosophyComputer ScienceLanguage
1992English

Editorial: Folk Epistemology. The Cognitive Bases of Epistemic Evaluation

Review of Philosophy and Psychology
PhilosophyExperimentalCognitive Psychology
2010English

Amanote Research

Note-taking for researchers

Follow Amanote

© 2025 Amaplex Software S.P.R.L. All rights reserved.

Privacy PolicyRefund Policy