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How and When Do Presidents Influence the Duration of Coalition Bargaining in Semi-Presidential Systems?
European Journal of Political Research
- United Kingdom
doi 10.1111/1475-6765.12227
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Categories
Sociology
Political Science
Date
July 26, 2017
Authors
LEE SAVAGE
Publisher
Wiley
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