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Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model
SSRN Electronic Journal
doi 10.2139/ssrn.2886453
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Date
January 1, 2016
Authors
Dirk Bergemann
Benjamin A. Brooks
Stephen Morris
Publisher
Elsevier BV
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