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Auction Design Without Commitment

Journal of the European Economic Association- United States

doi 10.1111/jeea.12009

Full Text

Abstract

Available in

Categories

EconomicsEconometricsFinance

Date

April 1, 2013

Authors

Hannu Vartiainen

Publisher

Oxford University Press (OUP)


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