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Dynamic Contracts With Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

SSRN Electronic Journal
doi 10.2139/ssrn.1610162
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Abstract

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Date

January 1, 2010

Authors
Alex GershkovMotty Perry
Publisher

Elsevier BV


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