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Contracts in Informed-Principal Problems With Moral Hazard

Economic Theory Bulletin
doi 10.1007/s40505-016-0093-0
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Abstract

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Date

February 5, 2016

Authors
Nicholas Charles Bedard
Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC


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