Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design

SSRN Electronic Journal
doi 10.2139/ssrn.214629
Full Text
Abstract

Available in full text

Date
Authors
Publisher

Elsevier BV

Related search

Efficient Mechanisms With Information Acquisition

SSRN Electronic Journal
2016English

Information in Mechanism Design

English

Security Design in Production Economy With Flexible Information Acquisition

SSRN Electronic Journal
2013English

Structural Bootstrapping—A Novel, Generative Mechanism for Faster and More Efficient Acquisition of Action-Knowledge

IEEE Transactions on Autonomous Mental Development
2015English

The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design

Journal of Economic Theory
EconomicsEconometrics
2004English

Dynamic Mechanism Design: Incentive Compatibility, Profit Maximization and Information Disclosure

SSRN Electronic Journal
2009English

Information Acquisition and Under-Diversification

Review of Economic Studies
EconomicsEconometrics
2010English

Information Acquisition and Reputation Dynamics

Review of Economic Studies
EconomicsEconometrics
2011English

A Mechanism Design Approach for Efficient and Reliable Resource Procurement in Cloud Computing.

International Journal of Advance Engineering and Research Development
2017English

Amanote Research

Note-taking for researchers

Follow Amanote

© 2024 Amaplex Software S.P.R.L. All rights reserved.

Privacy PolicyRefund Policy