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The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design

Journal of Economic Theory - United States
doi 10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.001
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Abstract

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Categories
EconomicsEconometrics
Date

July 1, 2004

Authors
Zvika Neeman
Publisher

Elsevier BV


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