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On Some Collusive and Signaling Equilibria in Ascending Auctions for Multiple Objects

SSRN Electronic Journal
doi 10.2139/ssrn.286559
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Abstract

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Date

January 1, 2001

Authors
Gian Luigi Luigi AlbanoFabrizio GermanoStefano Lovo
Publisher

Elsevier BV


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