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Repeated Signalling Games and Dynamic Trading Relationships

International Economic Review - United Kingdom
doi 10.2307/2527293
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Abstract

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Categories
EconomicsEconometrics
Date

May 1, 1998

Authors
Daniel R. Vincent
Publisher

JSTOR


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