Amanote Research

Amanote Research

    RegisterSign In

Common-Value Procurement Auctions With Renegotiation

Theoretical Economics Letters
doi 10.4236/tel.2014.48078
Full Text
Open PDF
Abstract

Available in full text

Date

January 1, 2014

Authors
Rimvydas BaltaduonisLucas Rentschler
Publisher

Scientific Research Publishing, Inc.


Related search

Optimal Cost Overruns: Procurement Auctions With Renegotiation

International Economic Review
EconomicsEconometrics
2018English

Sequential Procurement Auctions

Journal of Public Economics
EconomicsEconometricsFinance
1986English

Probabilistic Procurement Auctions

Review of Economic Design
EconomicsEconometricsFinance
2014English

Private Information Revelation in Common-Value Auctions

SSRN Electronic Journal
2002English

Sequential Auctions for Common Value Objects With Budget Constrained Bidders

Studies in Computational Intelligence
Artificial Intelligence
2009English

Corruption in Procurement Auctions

SSRN Electronic Journal
2006English

Bayesian Inference in Structural Second-Price Common Value Auctions

Journal of Business and Economic Statistics
EconomicsProbabilityUncertaintySocial SciencesStatisticsEconometrics
2011English

Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions

SSRN Electronic Journal
2001English

Multiobjective Combinatorial Auctions in Transportation Procurement

Mathematical Problems in Engineering
MathematicsEngineering
2014English

Amanote Research

Note-taking for researchers

Follow Amanote

© 2025 Amaplex Software S.P.R.L. All rights reserved.

Privacy PolicyRefund Policy