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Entry and Competition Effects in First-Price Auctions: Theory and Evidence From Procurement Auctions

Review of Economic Studies - United Kingdom
doi 10.1111/j.1467-937x.2009.00558.x
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Abstract

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Categories
EconomicsEconometrics
Date

October 1, 2009

Authors
TONG LIXIAOYONG ZHENG
Publisher

Oxford University Press (OUP)


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