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On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions

Econometrica - United Kingdom
doi 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00527.x
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Abstract

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Categories
EconomicsEconometrics
Date

July 1, 2004

Authors
Philip J. RenyShmuel Zamir
Publisher

The Econometric Society


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