Identification of First-Price Auctions With Biased Beliefs

Finance and Economics Discussion Series
doi 10.17016/feds.2015.056
Full Text
Abstract

Available in full text

Date
Authors
Publisher

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Related search

Competing First-Price and Second-Price Auctions

Economic Theory
EconomicsEconometrics
2018English

Commitment in First-Price Auctions

Economic Theory
EconomicsEconometrics
2017English

Commitment in First-Price Auctions

Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Computer ScienceTheoretical Computer Science
2015English

First Price Auctions: Monotonicity and Uniqueness

SSRN Electronic Journal
1997English

Identification in First-Price and Dutch Auctions When the Number of Potential Bidders Is Unobservable

Games and Economic Behavior
EconomicsEconometricsFinance
2011English

Entry and Competition Effects in First-Price Auctions: Theory and Evidence From Procurement Auctions

Review of Economic Studies
EconomicsEconometrics
2009English

Regret and Feedback Information in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions

Management Science
Management ScienceManagementOperations ResearchStrategy
2008English

The Effect of Corruption on Bidding Behavior in First-Price Auctions

European Economic Review
EconomicsEconometricsFinance
2009English

On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions

Econometrica
EconomicsEconometrics
2004English

Amanote Research

Note-taking for researchers

Follow Amanote

© 2025 Amaplex Software S.P.R.L. All rights reserved.

Privacy PolicyRefund Policy