Salesforce Contracting Under Uncertain Demand and Supply: Double Moral Hazard and Optimality of Smooth Contracts

Marketing Science - United States
doi 10.1287/mksc.2019.1171
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Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)

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