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Static vs. Dynamic Auctions With Ambiguity Averse Bidders
SSRN Electronic Journal
doi 10.2139/ssrn.2025872
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Date
January 1, 2012
Authors
Miguel Carvalho
Publisher
Elsevier BV
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